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lntroduction 
John B. Da vis and Asimina Christoforou 
This volume includes thirty-six important contributions to the economics of social institutions 
by leading figures in the history of the field. lts nine Parts are: Early Contributions, 
Methodological and Conceptual Issues, Old Institutionalism, New Institutionalism, Social 
Costs, Growth and Development, Institutions and Change, Institutions and Organizations, and 
The Third Sphere of the Economy and Institutions. This set of topics provides a comprehensive 
review of the origins and development of the economics of social institutions. lt addresses the 
main theoretical and policy concems that have occupied contributors to the approach. The 
economics of social institutions has been a well-established research program for over a century, 
and continues to evolve and develop new areas of investigation. This collection provides 
researchers, scholars, and interested students an extensive review of the leading contributions 
to the subject. It can be used to advance future thinking about the economics of social 
institutions and as a key resource for university teaching and education. 
Part 1: Early Contributions 
The first important contributions to the economics of social institutions announced a new 
approach to economics and advanced important criticisms of existing economic thinking. The 
articles collected in this Part of the book represent five inftuential statements of what an 
institutional econornic approach involves. The first three are well-known classics; the latter two 
take stock of early thinking. Together they lay out the main boundaries and commitments of 
the economics of social institutions. 
Thorstein Veblen's famous article (Chapter 1) defined many of the themes of institutionalism, 
and has since stood as a defining document for subsequent authors. His charge is straightforward 
and perhaps still applies to current economics: despite an already long history, economics at 
the beginning ofthe twentieth century was 'helplessly behind the times' (1898: 373), and was 
not up to the standards of modero science because it had failed to become an evolutionary 
scien<;e. 
The classical economists saw the laws and principies goveming the economy as normal and 
natural, and accordingly allowed ideals of conduct to serve as their measure of truth. Their 
taxonomic approach lacked an understanding of the economic process as continuous cumulative 
change. The Historical school was a modest advance, but was still pre-Darwinian and barely 
economic theory. The Austrian marginal utility and subjective value school had a ' faulty 
conception ofhuman nature,' and its 'hedonistic conception of man' as 'a lightning calculator 
ofpleasures and pains' (389) is incompatible with understanding how the 'econornic life history 
of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively 
change as the process goes on ' (391 ). 
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For Veblen the economic Iife of any community is constantly shaped and re-shaped by our 
changing material interests amidst a succession of changing economic institutions. Economics 
as an evolutionary science traces this cumulative process. 1t sees the habits and propensities of 
human beings as a reflection of their hereditary and cultural antecedents. Knowledge in 
economics needs to be formulated in terms of causal sequence. This is the case in other sciences, 
but economics has persisted with its theorems about 'normal' cases. This may serve sorne 
ceremonial or aesthetic effect, but it neglects the realities of modem industrial life and 
technological change. Veblen believed this state of affairs to be unsustainable. 
Walton H. Hamilton 's early infl uential statement of the 'institutional approach' (Chapter 2) 
was also instrumental in heralding a new approach to economics. He saw a divide between 
'value' economics with its focus on utility and the origins and manifestations of value and 
institutional economics with its emphasis on the customs and conventions of the economic 
system. The former, he charges, fails to recognize ' the complexity of the relations which bind 
human welfare to industry' ( 1919: 311) .:.... a complexity which only increases with time. Modem 
industrial society requires an economic theory which is able to explain it. Hamilton gives five 
tests for such a theory, and defends institutional econornics as passing all these tests. 
First, economic theory needs to be able to unify economic science. Economics appears to 
be a collection of at best overlapping inquines, and value economics does not bring them 
together. An institutional economics focus on economic organization can unify economic 
science. Secondly, economics needs to address the modern problem of control. The change in 
the nature of the modern economy makes it important to recognize that institutions are social 
arrangements that can be changed rather than natural phenomena. Thirdly, the subject matter 
of economics is institutions. The price system, credit, forms of business, contracts, property, 
and so on are all institutions of modern industrial society. Fourthly, economics is concerned 
with process. In contrast, value theory approaches phenomena as if they were unchanging 
physical substances. It cannot deal with a genetic and historical 'economic dynamics' and only 
offers an 'economic statics' of mechanical formulas and equilibrium ideas. Fifthly, economics 
needs to be based on an acceptable theory of human behavior. But neoclassical economics is 
tied to individualism, rationality, and utilitarianism, and thus ignores what modern psychology 
has taught us about human behavior. 
For all these reasons, then, institutional economics offers a way forward for economic 
science. Yet, for Hamilton, the future of institutional theory was uncertain. The issue, he 
believed, was whether institutional theory wou1d fit in with the thought of the time. 
John R. Commons (Chapter 3) was an influential leader of the Wisconsin school of 
institutionalism. He saw that there were competing accounts of what institutions are, and so 
defined them as being concerned with collective action that aimed at the control, liberation, 
and expansion of individual action. He believed this conception brought economics, 
jurisprudence, and ethics together, and determined the overall domain of institutional 
economics. This then meant that the ultimate unit of economic investigation was not individual 
behavior or the exchange of commodities, which had been the concern of the classical and 
'hedonic' economists, but rather transactions between individuals and the working rules that 
underlie them. 
Transactions are reducible to three economic activities: bargaining transactions, managerial 
transactions, and rationing transactions. Institutional economics studies these transactions in 
terms ofthe behavior ofindividuals who participate in them. The psychology which institutional 
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economics thus employs is a behavioristic psychology which Commons interpreted as 
negotiational psychology. lts subject matter is how every choice is at one and the same time a 
matter of performance, avoidance, and forbearance, and how the social relations of conflict, 
dependence, and order are implicit in every transaction. 
Commons' multidimensional view made it possible for institutional economics to explain 
all types of economic systems. All exhibited conflicts of interest which were manifested in the 
different working rules that governed transactions between people. Further, an economic 
system's working rules necessarily evolved as conflicts of interest were worked out between 
people, and this then transformed the character of transactions between them. This did not 
mean that one could predict how economic systems might change over time, despite popular 
social philosophies predicting one inevitable historical outcome or another. But Commons saw 
his approach to institutional economics as capable of explaining all such systems because 
transactions were fundamental in them all. 
Veblen, Hamilton, and Commons are all part of the American institutionalist tradition, but 
Karl Polanyi's contribution to institutionalist thinking has different origins. Polanyi was an 
in.fluential Hungarian economic historian, anthropologist, and social philosopher whose famous 
The Great Transformation (1944) described the social development of capitalism. His article 
here (Chapter 4) reviews the foundations of his approach known as substantivism and his 
interpretation of the different meanings of 'economic.' The main argument he advances is that 
'economic' has two meanings - the substantive and the formal - which have nothing in 
common. The formal meaning derives from the scarcity concept and the means--end relationship 
involved in explaining choice behavior in rational action terms as in standard economics. The 
substantive meaning concems the historical nature of the market system and its embeddedness 
in social institutions, culture, and history. 
Polanyi's principal goal was to understand the substantive meaning of 'economic.' This 
involves explaining those processes which sustain broad patterns of social economic integration 
over time. Foremost among these are reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange. Societies can 
then be differentiated and compared according to how they prioritize and determine the nature 
of these three processes. Polanyi characterized human economies generally asan 'instituted 
process' of interaction between human beings and their environment that took on many 
historical forms. 
But Polanyi was also keen to demonstrate that the formal meaning of 'economic' had little 
value outside its close association with exchange and markets dominated by prices. A formal 
economics by nature ignores the great variety of institutions, economic and non-economic, in 
which life is enmeshed and embedded, and accordingly it can only offer an abstract and partial 
representation of how economies function. This produces an exaggeration of the role that 
scarcity oran insufficiency of means plays in explaining choice. Indeed it leads us to overlook 
the changing place occupied by the economy itself in society at different historical times and 
places. 
Finally the article by Anne Mayhew (Chapter 5) closes this section by taking stock of the 
beginnings of institutionalism in relation to its American origins. The country's experience at 
the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries of rapid industrialization and 
social economic transformation provided strong ímpetus to evolutionary thinking and 
demonstrated to many the inadequacy of much of existing economics. It al so showed the need 
for drawing on social science knowledge from anthropology and sociology, particularly to 
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understand the role that culture played in economic change. Culture was thus an umbrella 
concept that brought together many aspects of social economic evolution. 
Veblen and Commons were quite different thinkers, but they both saw economic life as a 
cumulative process that constantly built upon itself without any teleology or final destination. 
What gave continuity to this process was the apparatus of economic institutions which 
determined the space in which economic activity occurred and yet which evolved and 
transformed that activity at the same time. 
Mayhew argues that thinking in this way was a product of the period from the 1880s through 
the l930s, when many economists were 'unorthodox.' This made for a variety of connections 
between the institutionalist thinking, populist social reformers, Marxists, and socialists. But 
neither Veblen nor Commons was a social radical. Neither saw the growth of big business and 
economic concentration that concemed many ·at the time as reversible or believed that a return 
toa pre-industrial, competitive laissezjaire economy was a realistic proposition. Rather, they 
were Darwinian thinkers who saw charige in culture, society's institutions, and the economy 
as interrelated and always on-going. This distinguished their thinking from other approaches 
in economics, and continues to distinguish the economics of social institutions from other types 
of economics. 
Part 11: Methodological and Conceptual Issues 
Any theoretical and empirical analysis of institutions must address the crucial questions of 
what institutions are and how they work. Economists have failed to give full merit to an analysis 
of institutions and their role in the economy, often because of complexities in determining 
their nature and effects and deriving universal concepts and mechanisms. We should not 
abandon our efforts and engage in institutional analysis by adopting an inter-disciplinary 
approach to shed light on the historical and cultural dimensions of this phenomenon. In this 
Part, we focus on contemporary articles that offer an overview of the makings and workings 
of institutions. 
In Geoffrey M. Hodgson's 2006 article (Chapter 6), we come across bis widely cited - and 
highly criticized- phrase: '[institutions] make up the stuff of sociallife' (2006: 2). Nonetheless, 
the author engages in a systematic analysis of what institutions are and what they do. First, 
institutions - such as language, money, law, table manners, and firms - are systems of 
established social rules that structure social relations by means of socially transmitted and 
potentially codifiable, evidently or immanently, normative rules, which constrain, enable, and 
change thought and behavior. Generally, they fall in between the two extremes of (instinctive 
or automatic) genetically encoded behavioral regularities (like blinking and breathing) and pure 
or full, conscious deliberation and intentionality. 
Secondly, habituation is the key mechanism by which individuals acquire dispositions to 
engage in previously adopted or acquired rule-like behavior, so that rules become embedded 
in social life and institutions are sustained. The author stresses that habits are not genetically 
transmitted; they are acquired in the social context, in a more or less unintended or customary 
manner, because individuals are born into a pre-existing institutional world which confronts 
them with its rules and norms. At the same time, habits do not negate deliberation, because 
institutions depend for their existence on individuals, their interactions, their shared customs 
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and thoughts. One of the author's major concerns is to combat the over-estimation of self-
organization and spont~neous order that are characteristic of standard assumptions of rational 
choice theory. 
Hodgson builds an alternative ontology of institutions in which behavioral habit and 
institutional structure are mutually entwined and reinforcing by combining both objective 
structures 'out there' and subjective events of human agency 'in the head.' These ideas are very 
similar to notions of structuration, introduced by authors such as Anthony Giddens and Pierre 
Bourdieu, whereby human behavior is shaped by the interplay of structure and agency. 
To define institutions, John R. Searle (2005) (Chapter 7) decides to go a different way by 
delineating the characteristics of institutional facts, such as money, government, property, social 
clubs, and marriage. He begins by making certain assumptions about individuals as conscious 
human beings with intentional, subjective states, who are capable of developing an objective 
canonical universe for the conduct of social behavior. He then argues that institutional facts 
typically require structures in the form of constitutive rules and exist only in virtue of collective 
acceptance of a certain status that carries and performs a set of functions. Thus their main 
features are collective intentionality, assignment of status functions, and recognition of deontic 
powers. This is the glue that holds society together, as the author repeatedly claims in the article. 
A general point reached here is that desire-based reasons for action (or deliberation) 
presuppose the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action. For Searle, 
the latter is identified with a relatively more conscious and intentional process of collective 
acceptance and collaboration among the members of a social group. This is consistent with a 
kind of methodological individualism that the author proposes whereby the individual 
component of collective action plays the role of means to ends. There is an interesting twist, 
which allows us to avoid the extremes of traditional perceptions of collectivism and 
individualism ( see al so Searle 1990: 410--11). 
However, it is likely that the author underestimates the determinative power of institutional 
facts. He fails to see individuals as 'instituted' entities, whose subjective altitudes and feelings 
are determined by externa}, institutional factors, which incorporate a historically and culturally 
cumulative collection of individual and collective intentionalities, even if members of the group 
do not come together to form a pact to follow certain rules, assign functions, and achieve 
collective goals. 
Mark Granovetter speaks of a kind of instituted individual in his analysis of embeddedness. 
In bis infamous 1985 article (Chapter 8), he purports that individuals do not act as atoms outside 
a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to the social categories ascribed to them. Rather, 
their attempts to purposive action are embedded in systems of social relations. In particular he 
stresses the role of concrete personal relations and relational structures (or 'networks') that 
gen~rate trust between members and discourage malfeasance in order to tackle uncertainty and 
opportunism in the market. 
Granovetter suggests an idea of embeddedness that does not comply with either of the two 
extremes of formalism and substantivism. For him, the formalist position, adopted by standard 
neoclassical analysis, as well as the 'new institutional economics,' argues that behavior results 
from the pursuit of self-interest by more or less atomized individuals, and thus offers an under-
socialized conception of economic man. On the other hand, the substantivist position, with 
roots in anthropology, Polanyi's analysis, the idea of the moral economy and Marxist theory, 
holds that economic life is submerged in social relations by imposing a generalized morality 
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that deterministically strains human deliberation, so it adheres to an over-socialized conception 
of economic behavior. 
The author makes the qualification that even when embeddedness, understood as networks 
of personal relations, out-performs authority relations or universal principies, it does not 
necessarily produce efficient solutions or social harmony, on account of the coordination 
problems and conflict that might emerge in network relations. Still, he purports that we should 
accept non-economic goals of sociability, approval, and status as part of individuals' rational 
choice decision-making. 
More importantly, as Fikret Adaman and Yahya M. Madra (2002) (Chapter 9) argue, 
Granovetter tends to adhere to an ontologically structuralist perception of substantivism that 
overlooks the Polanyian notion of the 'double movement,' whereby the process of dis-
embeddedness of economic behavior that is provoked by modemization is accompanied by a 
kind of re-embeddedness. That is, markets are re-embedded in new social relations and 
structures such as the so-called third sphere of the economy - charity, voluntary associations, 
gifts, and intra-community networks - where associative, egalitarian, and solidaristic modes 
of thought and action flourish to shield against the negative consequences of the market. 
In the final Part of the book, we offer a more detailed analysis of third-sphere activities and 
organizations, considered as a special kind of institution. Here we focus on the work of Adaman 
and Madra, who examine the third sphere from a methodologically substantivist and ontologically 
institutionalist point of view, whereby social structures shape and are shaped by i ndividuals. 
One of the most intriguing sections of the article is the authors' comprehensive taxonomy 
of economic models used to explain third-sphere activities. Generally they observe that theory 
tends to revolve around the so-called economistic fallacy, whereby all economic and non-
economic activities are analyzed through a formal-choice theoretic framework built upon the 
postulate of rational individual calculative behavior. Their analysis reveals that in economic 
models third-sphere activities are seen either as a means to rectify market imperfections (qua 
supplement) or to exacerbate them (qua pathology). More interestingly, the authors detect 
models in which institutions emerge and evolve as a result of the self-interested logic of rational 
choice, so they are conceptualized as a variant of the market (qua exchange). 
The authors conclude that such reductionism overlooks the heterogeneity of the economy 
and the endogeneity of the economic subject. Only when we take heed of these aspects of 
human action can we design and implement altemative organizational and institutional forms 
that enhance social welfare. 
To investigate the non-economic dimensions of human behavior and institutional analysis, 
Elinor Ostrom (2007) (Chapter 10), a political scientist with a Nobel Prize in economics, 
suggests that we encourage the exchange between different social science disciplines. 
After documenting the contribution of different strands of study in the fields of economics 
and political science, Ostrom sets the foundations for an inter-disciplinary institutional analysis. 
First she determines the analytical unit, the so-called action arena, that is identified with the 
area in which participants - individuals, families, firms, voluntary associations and 
governmental units- interact in a structure of incentives generated by: (i) the characteristics 
of the goods involved (that share features of non-excludability and non-subtractability ); (ii) the 
rules-in-use (that are enforced to resolve collective action problems and must be known, 
understood, and legitimate); and (iii) the attributes of the community (that achieves and 
maintains a shared understanding of rules, mutual responsibilities, and obligations). 
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Ostrom then suggests alternative arrangements that go beyond the typical market-state 
dichotomy and recognize the role of third-sphere activities discussed above within what she 
terms 'polycentric-linked systems.' Here public econornies are studied not as a single, isolated 
govemment, but as multiple levels of organization, ranging from small neighborhoods to 
intemational regimes. System-level outcomes depend on multilateral linkages between the 
public and private realms of activity, and generate both upward and downward causal processes. 
The conception of polycentric-linked systems is based on the idea that both markets and 
centralized governments cannot exist without a set of institutions that will ensure their 
effectiveness and accountability to public welfare objectives. 
In conclusion, the author argues that there are many questions to be tackled, especially with 
regard to the micro foundations of institutional analysis and the emergence of cooperation and 
trust among individuals. So, she proposes, 'Jet the potlatch continue' (2007: 258). 
Part 111: Old Institutionalism 
lnstitutionalism divided into 'old' institutionalism and 'new' institutionalism after World War 
ll, when early institutionalist thinking declined in inftuence in the econornics profession and 
a new approach to explaining institutions arose in conjunction with neoclassical economics. 
On the one hand, this cast into sharp relief what the two different approaches to institutions 
involved. On the other hand, that there were different approaches demonstrated the fundamental 
importance of institutions in the economy. The articles collected in this Part of the volume 
provide clear statements of what the early approach involved. The articles in the fourth Part do 
the same for 'new' institutionalism. 
Warren J. Samuels was an especially influential second-generation institutionalist who trained 
at the U niversity of Wisconsin under followers of Comrnons. His article (Chapter 11) is a critica! 
survey written at the end of the twentieth century when institutionalist economics had been 
displaced in the profession by a resurgent postwar neoclassical economics. Samuels' article 
both takes stock of the institutiona1ist paradigm and identifies a variety of reasons for 1ooking 
forward with optimism to its future development. 
First and foremost among the defining characteristics of the institutionalist paradigm, and 
its main difference from neoclassical economics, is the principie that the market is not the only 
means by which resources are allocated across different uses. lnstitutionalists focus on the 
organization and control of the economy as a system more encompassing than the market. Thus 
they reject methodological individualism and the idea that market equilibria explain the 
economy. This implies that laissez-jaire economic policy is both nalve and misguided. 
Economic policy needs to address institutional evolution and to do this it is necessary to 
recognize the role of social values in the operation of the economy. 
Samuels argues that institutionalism is by nature multidisciplinary and pluralistic, and this 
is shown through its many links to other approaches. Thus institutionalists have close 
connections to post-Keynesians, social economists, radical economists, and Marxists, while 
the 'new' institutional economics, the public choice school, and the new law and economics 
all combine institutional thinking with neoclassical concepts. That these different and often 
disparate approaches share a conviction that the institutional nature of the economy is 
fundamentally important demonstrates the future potential of the paradigm. What unites them 
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is a view of the economy as an evolutionary process operating on many social and economic 
levels. Thus institutionalism is fundamentally a holistic approach. 
The article by Geoffrey M. Hodgson (Chapter 12) appeared in the authoritative Joumal of 
Economic Literature and thus signaled recognition by the economics profession of the 
importance of institutionalism as a distinct approach in economics. In part this reftected the 
evolution of institutionalist economics into two distinct versions: the institutionalist economics 
of Veblen and Commons now referred toas the 'old' institutionalist economics anda 'new' 
institutionalist economics with el ose ti es to neoclassical economics. Hodgson has two important 
goals in his article. He seeks to answer implied criticisms of the 'old' institutionalist economics, 
that it was descriptive and anti-theoretical, and seeks to clearly distinguish 'old' institutionalism 
and 'new' institutionalism. The key claim he makes is that 'old' institutionalism employs a 
distinct conception of human agency that em·phasizes habit rather than individual rationality, 
and that this underlies our understanding of institutions. 
Hodgson answers the criticisms of 'old' institutionalism by saying that the institutionalists, 
like evolutionary biologists, have not attempted to build a single general institutionalist model, 
but have relied on the ideas of habits, rules, and their evolution to facilitate multiple historically 
specific investigations. Institutionalism thus moves from the abstract to the concrete, allowing 
it to enrich its explanations with psychological, anthropological, and sociological evidence. 
This frees it of the need for neoclassical micro foundations and methodological individualism. 
Yet this does not mean 'old' institutionalism is methodological collectivist. 
Regarding the 'new' institutionalist economics, its main characteristic is that it seeks to 
explain the emergence of institutions from rational individual behavior, or move from 
individuals to institutions taking individuals as given. This makes tastes and preferences the 
ultimate explananda of economics, whereas for the 'old' institutionalists tastes and preferences 
are molded by the institutional environment. One can understand this molding in terms of 
habit-driven behavior, and then investigate how the evolution of institutions inftuences habits. 
Thus what distinguishes 'old' institutionalism is how habits and institutions are mutually 
inftuencing and intertwined. 
Malcolm Rutherford's article (Chapter 13) reviews the twentieth-century history of 'old' 
institutionalism in order to explain its rise, appeal, and post-1945 experience. He then looks at 
how 'new' institutionalism has defined itselfrelative to 'old' institutionalism in terms of shared 
themes and departures. He concludes that there have been and are likely to continue to be many 
'institutionalisms' over time in economics and the social sciences. Their shared theme is that 
institutions matter a great deal, and economists need to think hard about how institutions shape 
economic behavior and are shaped by economic, political, and ideological factors. 
Veblen, Harnilton, Wesley Mitchell, Walter Stewart, John M. Clark, and Commons were the 
original founders of institutionalism. In the years after the end ofWorld War I the institutionalist 
program was perceived as modern and scientific. In his 1927 Presidential Address to the 
American Economics Association Mitchell emphasized that institutionalism was empirical and 
quantitative. Neoclassical economics was thought to be based on outmoded psychology. Thus 
institutionalism attracted many adherents in the interwar period. Major university programs 
were established at Columbia, Wisconsin, and Texas. Institutionalists were active in economic 
research and policy formation, for example in the development of unemployment insurance, 
workmen's compensation, Social Security, labor legislation, public utility regulation, 
agricultura} price supports, and promotion of planning for high levels of output. 
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Rutherford identifies severa! réasons for institutionalism 's loss of power and prestige after 
1945. It did not develop psychological foundations for economics persuasive to economists. It 
failed to further develop its theories of social norms, technological change, legislative and 
judicial decision-making, transactions, and forms of business enterprise beyond the initial ideas 
of its founders. The rise of Keynesian thinking displaced its theory of business cycles. lt was 
not part of the econometric revolution. And much of its reform agenda was adopted. Despite 
this, 'new' institutionalism drew on many of the ideas of 'old' institutionalism. Where it differed 
was in its effort to combine them with neoclassical concepts and methodology. 
Tony Lawson's article (Chapter 14) takes up an important issue in 'old' institutionalism, namely 
its dichotomous treatment of institutions, understood in terms of their ceremonial aspect, and 
technology, understood as a driver of change- a dichotomy sometimes traced to Veblen. Lawson 
sees the dichotomy as a weakness of sorne interpretations of 'old' institutionalism, and traces it 
to problems involved in explaining the mutual dependence of human subjects and social structures. 
The issue is central because a truly evolutionary view needs to explain an overall process of 
cumulative change in both institutions and technology, not as a one-sided materialist account. 
In Lawson's view, the problem is that, for sorne, institutions are seen as static and resistant 
to change whereas technology is seen as dynamic and the ímpetus for change. But this 
misrepresents the nature of institutions, which as part of social structure are systems of social 
interaction between people and constantly undergo change. In virtue of this they must be said 
to possess emergent powers in the sense of continually exhibiting new phenomena. Lawson 
terms this agency-structure relationship between social structures and people the 
transformational model of social activity. The principal idea is that human agency and social 
structures are irreducible to one another and so are mutually influencing. 
However, one strand of 'old' institutionalism tends to see social structures as fully 
determinative of human activity (the opposite of how mainstream economics fully reduces 
social structures to individual behavior). Lawson cites passages from Clarence Ayres and 
Hamilton that indicate this, and al so argues that it is not easy to see precisely what Veblen 's 
position was because he avoided ontological argument. Many recent contributors to 'old' 
institutionalism, he allows, are more nuanced in their views. This suggests that 'old' 
institutionalism continues to have considerable vitality and potential to explain social reality, 
and gives further understanding to the idea of evolution as cumulative change. 
Part IV: New Institutionalism 
The 'new' institutionalists adopted an approach to institutions that departs from the tradition 
of institutionalist thinking inaugurated by Veblen, Hamilton, Commons, and Polanyi. For the 
latter, institutions shape and guide individual behavior. In contrast, the 'new' institutionalists 
see institutions as the products of individual behavior. Institutions also create incentives for 
individuals, and evolve according to the ways and extent to which they facilitate people's 
wealth-maximizing goals. In addition, the 'new' institutionalists differ from the 'old' 
institutionalists in emphasizing the market as a centrally important institution. Societies are 
then compared in terms of how development of markets influences economic development. 
Douglass C. North, a co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1993, is one of the 
originators of the 'new' institutionalist approach, and his article here (Chapter 15) gives an 
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important summary of this thinking. He sees institutions as humanly devised structures of rules 
that can be informal and formal. In both cases institutions function to create order and reduce 
uncertainty in markets, and this promotes economic growth. One important way in which this 
has occurred historically is through extension of the institution of prívate property. Clearly 
defined property rights reduce market transaction costs. When transaction costs are low, there 
are gains from trade and increased specialization, and markets are extended. But the extension 
of markets is often accompanied by national conftict. Whether such conftict can be overcome 
and growth maintained has consequently depended historically on whether property rights can 
be extended across national boundaries. 
One dimension to this history concems how path dependence plays a role in institutional 
development. Path dependence is the idea of how yesterday's institutional framework promotes 
or limits economic evolution and change in the future. Thus an existing matrix of interdependent 
institutions can lock in conditions which constrain or sustain growth. The latter situation is one 
where political institutions have a key role in promoting productivity-raising economic activities 
and increasing returns, while the former situation is one dominated by monopolies that tend to 
redistribute income rather than increase it. North uses the historical experience ofEngland and 
Spain in colonizing the New World as an illustration. English political (and religious) 
institutions favored decentralized economic development in North America, and this 
strengthened wealth-maximizing entrepreneurial activity. Spain transferred highly centralized, 
bureaucratic political institutions to Latin America, and this rather limited local economic 
development and generated instability. In both cases the history of institutional development 
in Europe was carried over to the New World and deterrnined the nature of development there. 
Thus for North, world economic development has been uneven because countries have very 
different kinds of political and economic institutions. 
Mancur Olson's work focused on the economics of political institutions and the logic of 
interest groups and collective action. He was particularly concemed with how interest groups 
accumulated power and inftuenced economic growth. In his article here (Chapter 16) he 
compares dictatorship and democracy in terms of their implications for economic development. 
Olson's premise is that no society functions well unless it is peaceful and secures basic public 
goods. Small societies tend to achieve this unproblematically because individuals see the 
benefits of cooperation and collective action. Large, diverse societies find collective action 
difficult to achieve because the typical individual benefits very little from collective goods. 
Large societies, then, ha ve historically had the choice of roving bandits or stationary bandits, 
that is, dictators. People tend to prefer the dictator if theft takes the forro of regular taxation 
and violence is minimized, particularly on the part of roving bandits. Dictators recognize that 
peace and prosperous populations increase what they can take in taxes and so take less than 
roving bandits. Olson calls this 'the first blessing of the invisible hand.' 
Democracies, in contrast, operate by majority rule. Majorities that win elections have an 
interest in controlling tax collections, but since they also earn a significant share of market 
income, their optimal tax rate is lower than that of dictators. Democratic majorities express an 
'encompassing interest,' but when majorities are slim and special interests are influential, that 
'encompassing interest' can be narrow and redistribution from the population high - though 
rarely as high as dictatorships. For Olson, the answer to this is the security of individual rights, 
particularly property rights and contract rights, but also free speech and the rule of law 
generally. Democracy is more stable on this basis, but whether democracy emerges at all has 
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largely been an accident of history whereby those who overthrow dictatorships lack the power 
to establish their own. ~t is the balance of power, that is, which gives rise to constitutional 
protections of rights. 
Oliver E. Williamson, a 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics, is one of the most 
highly cited of all economists. He is not only an irnportant contributor to 'new' institutionalism, 
particularly in the emphasis he places on transaction costs, but has also done much to establish 
the scope and nature of that approach. The article included here (Chapter 17) is bis comprehensive 
and influential statement of what 'new' institutionalism covers. Williamson's starting point in the 
article is social analysis and the four different levels on which it proceeds. 
These four levels are differentiated according to abstractness versus concreteness, how long 
the institutions on each level tend to last, and their respective purposes. Higher, more abstract 
levels impose constraints on lower levels, though there are feedback effects from lower to higher 
levels. The first level is social embeddedness, and concerns norms, customs, mores, and 
traditions. Institutions on this leve] are taken as given by most institutional economists, and 
persist for long periods of time - centuries or millennia. The second level is the institutional 
enyironment, and is the domain of formal rules of the game, especially as relate to property 
rights and legal processes. Getting the rules 'right' is the first order of economizing. Such rules 
last decades and centuries. The third level is what Williamson labels 'governance' or explains 
in terms of the play of the game. This leve] addresses how formal rules operate in terms of their 
definition, management, and enforcement. Williamson emphasizes that what is fundamental 
here is aligning govemance structures and transactions. The time span is shorter, and at issue 
is second-order economizing. Finally, the fourth leve] of social analysis and institutions pertains 
to resource allocation and employment. This is the third order of economizing, and is regarded 
as operating continuously. 
In addition, Williamson lists and explains a set of 'good ideas' he sees as the achievement 
of 'new' institutionalism: an emphasis on human actors, attention to feasibility and caution 
over ideals, improved thinking about the interna] structure of firms, concern with 
operationalization, the goal of theory development, and a commitment to prediction. 
The last paper in this section, by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (Chapter 18), provides 
an empírica] evaluation of the historical success in achieving long-run economic growth of two 
fundamental types of institutions: property rights institutions and contracting institutions. 
Contracting institutions are defined as the rules and regulations governing contracts between 
ordinary citizens. Property rights institutions are the rules and regulations protecting citizens 
against política] elites. 
The premise of the paper is that while institutional research has demonstrated the importance 
of institutions, it has not adequately distinguished the differential impact of these two types of 
institutions to establish their relative importance. Yet distinguishing these institutions 
empirically depends on finding valid proxies for them. This paper thus sets out these measures 
of each, and then uses a multiple instrumental variables approach to explain their respective 
effects on growth by the history of European colonization. Their estimation procedures show 
a large effect of property rights institutions on economic outcomes. Where there are significant 
constraints on política] elites and genuine protections against expropriation there has been 
substantially higher income per capita. Contracting institutions, however, have had a more 
limited effect, and appear to have no effect on income per capita, investment as a share of GDP, 
or prívate credit as a share of GDP. 
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Acemoglu and Johnson conjecture that a key difference between the two types of institutions 
concems the recourse individuals have when these institutions are weak. Weak contracting 
institutions allow a variety of adjustments that alleviate their effects. However, when property 
rights institutions are weak and checks on política} power are lacking, there are few ways 
individuals can adjust. Nonetheless, the authors allow that the historical experience on which 
the study is based may not apply to other historical experiences, and so contracting institutions 
could have stronger effects on growth in other circumstances. 
Part V: Social Costs 
Social costs are distinguished from prívate costs. In traditional Pigovian welfare economics, 
social costs are prívate costs plus extemalities. Extemalities are then defined as costs and 
benefits which 'spill over onto' or fall .on individuals and groups not party to the production 
and market transactions where they are generated. Costs are negative externalities (such as 
pollution) and benefits are positive externalities (such as education). Altematively, social costs 
are seen as systemic effects of prívate production rooted in the profit-maxirnizing behavior of 
business. Social costs have been investigated in connection with social institutions in tenns of 
the rules that govern those who bear them. 
Ronald H. Coase was the recipient of the Nobel Príze in economics in 1991. His 'The 
Problem of Social Cost' (Chapter 19) is one of the mostly highly cited papers in economics, 
and is widely agreed to have laid the foundation for the modero field of law and economics. 
The paper addressed the problem of market externalities as set out in Pigovian welfare 
economics. Coase called for a change in approach replacing the case-by-case method that was 
dominant with a more systematic one based on economic theory. Its principal achievement was 
what carne to be known as the 'Coase theorem,' or that in the absence of transaction costs 
externalities are intemalized, prívate and social costs coincide, and from a resource allocation 
perspective legal rules do not matter. Thus Coase offers a strong argument for the efficiency of 
the market mechanism and reasoning about law in terms of costs and benefits. 
There has been much debate over the realism of the 'Coase theorem,' but the transaction 
cost concept has been inftuential. To layout his argument, Coase set out a case that assumed 
that there are no market transaction costs, though he was fully aware that this was unrealistic. 
He reasoned that in such circumstances people would bargain in such a way as to produce the 
most efficient distribution of resources whatever had been their initial allocation. The question 
that then arises is whether policymakers should aim to produce measures that would reduce 
transaction costs to increase the economy's efficiency. This would presumably be superior to 
a resource allocation process that was carried out through legal proceedings and passing laws 
regulating markets. For example, if we take factory smoke pollution as a representative case, 
the issue would not be whether to eliminate smoke pollution but rather to determine the optimal 
amount of smoke pollution defined in tenns of maximizing the value of production. 
K. William Kapp's paper (Chapter 20) calls for a wider rather than narrower understanding 
of social costs and benefits - one that he argues entails a re-oríentation of economic theory and 
the development of an altemative theory of social value. Formal economic theory, particularly 
neoclassical econornics, employs the method of logico-mathematical deduction from abstract 
assumptions about economic rationality and the equilibrium nature of markets. This method 
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is not helpful in explaining the causal processes which determine social costs and benefits, 
particularly in modem jndustrial societies which are highly interdependent and increasingly 
complex. Causal processes in such societies have a cumulative character which moves 
economies away from balance and equilibrium. 
Alfred Marshall developed the neoclassical theory of social costs. Markets are seen to be 
generally efficient, but there is occasional market failure associated with the externa] economies 
or diseconomies of the firm. Kapp argues that social costs are not exceptional but are business 
costs systematically transferred to third parties or the community as a whole. The search for 
profit leads firms to minimize the private costs of production, and do so by transforming prívate 
costs wherever possible into social costs. Thus social costs are the norm andan intrinsic feature 
of economies dominated by firms that seek Lo maximize profit. Consequently, while firms and 
industries may exhibit a formal rationality in a Marshallian sense, this can coincide with an 
overall irrationality of the social system of which they are a part. 
Kapp thus recommends economists need an altemative theory of social value and operate 
with a theory of social rationality. This is an elusive idea, but it takes the perspective of the 
social system as a whole in which social costs are explained in terms of how modem industrial 
society and modem technologies impose physical and psychological effects on health, and 
social benefits are explained with respect to essential human needs. 
Part VI: Growth and Development 
Neoclassical development theory (that stems from growth models developed by Solow [ 1956], 
Swan [ 1956], and Tobin [ 1955]) and new economic institutionalism (see Part IV) predict that 
institutions, particularly property rights and formal rules, will enhance economic growth by 
reducing transaction costs. Thus economic problems in developing countries can be resolved 
by building better institutions, which improve govemance and achieve the maximizatíon of 
market freedom and the protection of property rights. These views have received stark criticism. 
In this Part, we investigate the debate that has emerged. Due to limited space, we refer the 
reader to altemative sources in the development literature conceming the role of social 
institutions ( e.g., Adelman and Morris 1967; Sen 1999). 
We begin with R. C. O. Matthews' 1986 presidential address (Chapter 21 ), in which he tries 
to discover the sources of growth by appealing to an economics of institutions. He argues that 
in the first half of the twentieth century economists gave undue weight to the Marshallian 
conception of utility-maximizing individuals in a given institutional structure, in spite of 
opposition from the Veblenian institutionalist school. Only recently have economists focused 
on the role of institutions and analyzed their determinants by the tools of economic theory. 
Matthews adopts a general definition of institutions, which he believes transcends the main 
approaches that appear in economics, namely property rights, conventions and norms, types 
of contract, and authority: institutions are seen as sets of rights and obligations affecting people 
in their economic lives. Nonetheless, he maintains a transaction costs approach, similar to new 
economics institutionalism. 
In relation to the growth question, bis main caveat is that the movement toward Pareto-
superior institutions is not achieved at once, as an instant response by maximizing, 
self-interested individuals to a changing environment of technologies and taste. Rather, we are 
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looking ata very long run, possibly pennanent process of transition, where institutional change 
depends less on conscious optimization and more on events of historical accident and processes 
of competitive selection. This is due to complexities and forces of inertia that arise from non-
voluntary interactions and power structures. This, for example, explains why state policies for 
redistribution might produce less efficiency and growth, and serve to favor the interest of people 
with the most political inftuence, who may not coincide with the disadvantaged target-
population, or with the priorities of the median voter. Therefore, Matthews purports, it is 
difficult to k:now whether institutional arrangements are important to growth, either as a source 
or as an explanation of cross-country differences. 
He closes his address with a plea for more empírica! studies to substantiate the relationship 
between institutions and economic growth. Nearly two decades later, Dani Rodrik, Arvind 
Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi (Chapter 22) offered their own response in their well-
k:nown 2004 article. 
They begin with the premise that traditional growth factors such as physical and human 
capital accumulation, as well as technological progress, are at best proximate causes of 
economic growth, since they fail to answer the question why sorne societies managed to 
accumulate and innovate more rapidly than others. For the authors, it is important to del ve into 
the deeper determinants of growth, which are potentially captured by three strands of thought: 
geography/climate, intemational trade, and institutional change. They test their hypotheses 
empirically by conducting regression analyses and various robustness tests to conclude that the 
quality of institutions, measured by the existence of property rights and the rule of law, trumps 
integration and geography and outperforms these variables once it enters the growth equation. 
Indeed, they use various statistical and econometric procedures that confirm what is implied 
in their title, that institutions rule! 
However, these procedures pose problems, most of which derive from violations of exogeneity 
and homogeneity assumptions needed to establish universal measures and produce sound 
econometric results. Of course, quantitative methods can provide the econornist with an important 
tool-kit for empirical evaluation. But caution is required when we try to substantiate the robustness 
of our results by appealing to readymade rules such as the American Economic Review test (AER-
test), which is contrived by the authors in the article and has not stood against mathematical proof. 
Richard G. Lipsey (2009) (Chapter 23) is also rather critica! of such estimation procedures 
and their underlying rationale. He argues that the absence of a clear causal link between growth 
and any one set of institutions, such as well-developed property rights, makes it extremely 
difficult to measure the importance of institutions empirically by means of correlating the 
existence of these institutions with various national growth performances. 
The author prefers an evolutionary view of the growth process and thus applies a methodology 
that relies on the historical documentation of economic growth and institutional change as they 
took place in the West from Medieval times. The main idea developed here is that growth cannot 
be sustained without technological advancement, which is brought about by institutions that 
promote invention and innovation. By means of a 'ftower metaphor' the author argues that the 
two industrial revolutions that took place in the West and led to self-sustaining growth can be 
attributed to institutional developments associated with the rise of science and universities that 
failed to emerge in non-Westem regions, such as China and Islamic countries. 
Beyond the author's technological determinism, there is one point that deserves further merit: 
the commodification of knowledge. From the beginning of the paper the author identifies 
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innovation with the commercialization of an invention, that is, of a new product, process, or 
fonn of organization. H~ thus focuses on what he calls elsewhere general purpose technologies 
(that, for example, produce steam and electricity) (Lipsey et al. 2005), or inventions and 
innovations based on technological knowledge that create economic value in the form of 
monopoly profits. However, this perception of innovation rules out the non-economic motives, 
which drive scientists and innovators and produce breakthrough products, such as medicines 
forrare diseases, which might not produce profits but enhance development by improving the 
quality of life. 
Ha-Joon Chang (2011) (Chapter 24) applies a comparative historical analysis to explore 
countries' growth pattems and institutional settings. He objects to the dominant view that so-
called Global Standard Institutions (OSI), which take the fonn of market liberalization and the 
protection of prívate property, are more effective for economic development. For instance, he 
argues that developed countries, particularly in the Anglo-American world, consider 'free' 
markets and 'prívate' ownership as their source of success and advocate for further liberalization 
and privatization in less developed countries. Nonetheless, history shows that they have most 
likely implemented a high leve] of protectionism in opposition to the free-market ideal, while 
combining various forms of property rights, including state and communal ownerships. 
More importantly, Chang stresses that the dominant discourse is not equipped to construct 
the proper policies that will bring about change, precisely because it does not have a theory for 
institutional change and oscillates between extreme voluntarism and extreme fatalism. 
Voluntarism, on the one hand, overstates the impact of rational self-interest to provoke 
conscious deliberation and instantaneous change toward more efficient institutions. Fatalism, 
on the other hand, cultivates the detenninist view that a lack of GSis supports an 'anti-
development culture,' and thus overlooks the existence of competing values and ideologies that 
could overrule this stereotype and en force a gradual move toward a diverse set of institutions 
that favor development and welfare in the economic and ethical context of a particular region. 
Therefore, in less developed countries the dominant discourse encourages change in institutions, 
rather than in policies, even when deregulation and privatization policies fail. 
The author concludes that there is need to go beyond this idea of alleged institutional 
deficiency, for ' institutions are politically too important to be left to those who believe in these 
simplistic and extremist views' (2011: 495). 
Part VD: Institutions and Change 
In this part of the volume, we center on the issue of institutional change. Institutional change 
is often studied in the context of evolutionary economics, which focuses on why and how 
knowledge, preferences, technology, and institutions - factors typically assumed to be 
exogenous in economic models - change in the historical process, and what impact these 
changes have on the state of the economy. Sorne authors define evolution in relation to the 
Darwinian theory of natural selection (i.e., determined by the innate dispositions and adaptation 
mechanisms - institutional regulations, habits, and preferences - transmitted through social 
learning); others prefer a Schumpeterian synthesis of innovation (i.e., implemented by 
pioneering entrepreneurs with unique capabilities and motivation and diffuses throughout the 
economy in competitive imitation processes) (Witt 2006: 2-3, 14-16). 
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An article written by Viktor Vanberg and Wolfgang K.erber (Chapter 25) and published in 1994 
combines these two approaches via the economic notion of competition. Their principal interest 
is not how the process of competition affects various equilibrium states, but how it inftuences the 
distribution of characteristics in a population over time (population thinking). Hence institutional 
evolution is understood as competition-induced change in a framework of 'variation-selection-
retention': the generation of innovation by certain agents might produce profits that offer them 
the lead in performance and enhance competition with others, who wish to secure their survival 
via imitation or new variation, giving new ímpetus to the evolutionary process. 
Vanberg and Kerber apply their approach to the competition among polities or jurisdictions. 
Here the feedback mechanisms that determine institutional competition at a certain level of 
jurisdiction, be it local administration or state government, are of two kinds: poli ti cal selection 
(collective decision procedures and legislation) and market-type selection (individuals' or firms ' 
decision to migrate - or, in market terms, exit). Thus regional administrators may choose to 
lower taxes or state governments may liberalize their domestic markets in order to invite 
consumers and investors and become more competitive globally. To rectify state and market 
failures, the authors suggest a kind of constitutionally constrained competition (as a logical 
extension of the research program of the Freiberg school), whereby innovativeness is channeled 
toward efficiency or any other normative criterion that the population considers desirable. For 
jurisdictions the normative criterion suggested is 'citizen-sovereignty,' analogous to the 
individualist-liberal criterion of consumer-sovereignty in markets. 
However, in this framework firms and jurisdictions alike are subject to consumers' or 
citizens' preferences that are represented in the constitutional rules or the rules-of-the-game 
and are thus taken to be exogenous and, more importantly, based on free will. How preferences 
are formed is a question left unanswered. 
Samuel Bowles ( 1998) (Chapter 26) offers a study of the formation of preferences and the 
inftuence exerted by markets and economic institutions in general on the evolution of values, 
tastes, and personalities. He explores the hypothesis that preferences are endogenous, contrary 
to the assumption of exogenous preferences that economists usually adopt in their models 
despite its unrealistic connotations. 
Bowles distinguishes between a number of effects of markets and other economic institutions 
on preferences that have been documented in the theoretical and empiricalliterature. He makes 
the qualification that few are supported by uncontroversial, empirical evidence, but most are 
plausible and consistent with considerable evidence. 
The general idea across these groups of effects is that market-oriented allocation mechanisms 
can generate a novel set of values and objectives that might reduce the salience of non-market 
concerns (social, moral, political) and spill over to other facets of life (e.g., paid labor induces 
us to think of subjects as commodities). At the same time, markets still rely on social norms 
and personal relationships of trustworthiness and credibility, particularly in imperfectly 
competitive settings and incomplete contractual relations, to confront uncertainty and 
opportunism. In this sen se, the effectiveness of policies and their political viability depend on 
how markets and other economic institutions affect preferences. However, in this paper Bowles 
implicitly assumes that institutions are exogenous determinants of individual preferences and 
behavior, and thus offers less attention to the process of institutional evolution. 
In his 2007 paper (Chapter 27), Masahiko Aoki claims that institutions are endogenously 
shaped and sustained in repeated operational plays of a game, where players are conceived as 
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rationally bounded agents that hold common perceptions about the way the game is played. 
According to the author,_aspects of agents' bounded rationality, which presupposes limitations 
to their abilities to have knowledge of all the relevant parameters, causal mechanisms and 
probabilities, play a significant role in mechanisms of institutional change. 
In particular, change depends on so-called institutions-induced individual game models, 
which are simplified, personal versions of the objective game structure and provide sufficient 
information for individual choices in a currently prevailing situation. Thus a change in the 
objective game-form explicit- dueto accumulation of knowledge and skills, new policies, or 
variations in technological and environmental conditions - may start to generate interna} 
inconsistencies or endanger the sustained compatibility with environments. After a certain 
threshold, hitherto held individual perceptions about the ways in which the game is played 
become problematic and crisis emerges in the economic-, social-, and political-exchange 
domain. The transitional process converges when and only when: (i) a new pattern of plays of 
the game emerges and becomes collectively recognized as the way the game is now being 
played; and (ii) agents' new action choices generate satisfactory pay-offs to them. 
Oespite the advantages of a game-theoretic framework, as discussed by the author earlier in 
his analysis, there are certain drawbacks. Basically, the formalism applied leads to an approach 
whereby the method defines the concept, so that institutions, the fruit of human mind, heart 
and soul, are eventually equated with a 'game,' or 'common knowledge,' or 'equilibrium' states, 
or even 'prices' asan aggregation and summary of individuals' evaluations. 
Avner Greif and David D. Laitin (2004) (Chapter 28) try to take distance themselves from 
the self-enforcing aspects of game-theoretic explanations of institutional change. They propose 
a unified framework by bridging game theory (where institutions are simply states of 
equilibrium) and historical institutionalism (where the formation of institutions is perceived as 
a historical process, induced by complex human motivations and feedback processes). In this 
manner, they aim to balance game theory's bias toward institutional stability and historical 
institutionalism's tendency to over-predict institutional change. The authors illustrate this 
dynamic approach through two paired comparisons of institutions- political regime in Venice 
and Genoa and cleavage structure in Nigeria and Estonia. 
Their framework relies on two related concepts: quasi-parameters and institutional 
reinforcement. The end result is that change constitutes a kind of evolutionary refinement of 
institutions, without considerable departures from the past, since the direction of change is 
path-dependent. This is similar to Aoki's observation that transition revolves around a 'focal 
point' determined by past equilibria and the leve) of dissonance. Nonetheless, there is room 
for deliberation: if quasi-parameters are observable, then policymakers might actually realize 
that past behavior is no longer self-enforcing, and decide to provide for an alternative set of 
behaviors by specifying new rules and organizations. For example, in response to rising 
ínter-clan conflict and political instability in Genoa, the authorities decided to change the 
structures of governance by hiring a non-Genoese to be military leader, judge, and 
administrator, and thus foster the clans' ability to cooperate by creating a military balance 
between them. 
However, a closer inspection of the authors' analysis reveals aspects of standard game theory 
that contradict a deeper historical analysis, when, for instance, they accept conceptions of 
equilibrium states and prices. Ultimately, instead of explaining institutional change, the authors 
focus on reinforcing processes. 
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In his paper (Chapter 29), Paul A. David tries to see why history matters in the formation 
and functioning of human organizations and institutions. For the author, the roots of path 
dependence in economic phenomena lie in three factors, namely structures of mutually 
consistent expectations, transmission mechanisms to new members, and complementarities 
and interdependencies across various organizations and institutions. 
What this discussion implies, according to the author, is that extraneous features of initial 
conditions that characterize the historical context within which institutions and organizations 
are formed, can become enduring constraints to the degree that they combine to favor 'stasis' 
and 'incremental' or 'conservative' change, rather than crises and revolutions. lt is pointed out 
that such a process resembles those of technological or biological evolution, in that 'machines' 
or 'genes' constitute sources of accumulated technical information or natural mutations 
respectively, and change by means of developments and variations that are founded upon and 
adapted to pre-existing aspects of these objects. 
Generally, institutions are seen as what the author terms 'precedent-based rule structures,' 
whose obvious functional limitations stem from their remate accidental origins, even though 
institutional forms may initially have been established to serve a social purpose, which has 
since been forgotten or rendered irrelevant. Consequently, human agency and deliberation 
appear to have a limited role. Even though the author distinguishes institutional forms from 
technological systems in that machines are not composed of sensate, volitional actors, he does 
not hesitate to claim that institutional forms are self-perpetuating and thus require less human 
direction to be reproduced compared with technological systems. lf human intervention is 
gradually eliminated, then it comes to no wonder why we continuously fail to explain how 
institutions change. 
Part VIII: Institutions and Organizations 
What are organizations, and what different kinds of organizations are there? What relation-
ships do organizations have to social institutions? Much research on social institutions 
explains them in terms of their relation to markets. Organizations, for example business 
firms, are also often explained in terms of their relation to markets. This suggests that the 
relationship between organizations and social institutions can be explained in terms of how 
they differently relate to the market. Alternatively, organizations can be seen as intermediate 
between social institutions and markets. The three papers in this Part give different answers 
to these questions. 
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, in a highly cited paper (Chapter 30), begin by 
addressing a fundamental issue in organization theory, namely that different kinds of 
organizations are remarkably homogeneous and similar in form. Max Weber associated this 
with the principie of bureaucracy asan expression of rationality- what DiMaggio and Powell 
label the 'iron cage view.' Weber associated bureaucratization with the needs of the capitalist 
market economy. As firms became larger and larger, the rationalizing impulse of the market 
demanded their strict bureaucratic organization. But DiMaggio and Powell argue that the 
principie of homogeneity has itself become a cause of bureaucratization and rationality, 
irrespective of whether it is associated with demands for efficiency. 1be state and the professions 
ha ve been the great drivers of this rationalization in the second half of the twentieth century. 
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What, then, are the forces behind this self-propelling process of homogenization? The key 
concept advanced here ~s isomorphism, a process of change that constrains one unit in a 
population to resemble other units in similar environmental circumstances. If we then 
distinguish competitive and· institutional types of isomorphism, modern organizations can be 
understood in terms of the concept of institutional isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell then 
describe three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: coercive (stemming from 
political inftuence), mimetic (resulting from responses to uncertainty), and normative 
(associated with professionalization). These mechanisms function as predictors for 
organizational change, allowing for a variety of hypotheses concerning such matters as resource 
allocation, organization goal ambiguity, technology adoption, and so on. 
The framework generales a number of paradoxical results. Societies as a whole are driven 
by rationality orare 'smart' but the homogenization of organizations makes them 'dumb' by 
comparison. DiMaggio and Powell recommend greater study of how organizations evolve and 
greater attention to pluralism as a guiding value in public policy deliberations. 
In his paper in this Part (Chapter 31), Claude Ménard addresses the different relationships 
between institutions, markets, and organizations. The goal of the paper is to clarify the 
terminological ambiguities surrounding these key concepts that have operated in the 
institutionalist literature in order to deepen our understanding of them. Ménard 's view is that 
institutions overarch and subsume markets and organizations; that is, markets and organizations 
are always embedded in an institutional environment. Further, while markets and organizations 
overlap in many ways and give rise to hybrid forms, they also have their respective distinct 
features. This precludes saying that markets and organizations Iie along a single continuum of 
forms. 
Why do institutions operate ata higher level of generalization than markets and organizations? 
Institutions determine the general rules of the game and function as a framework establishing 
the social acceptability of different possible actions. Markets are a specific type of institutional 
arrangement that concerns the conditions under which goods and services are produced and 
exchanged. Organizations, especially business firms, are a specific type of institutional 
arrangement with identifiable boundaries which coordinate activities and specific assets through 
implicit and explicit rules and agreements. Institutions, markets, and organizations can thus be 
explained in terms of their foundations, or principies of consistency working within each, 
according to their different modes of coordination, and with respect to their ' raisons d'étre.' 
Ménard argues that understanding institutions, markets, and organizations first as 'pure 
concepts' allows us then to better understand their intersections in hybrid forms in the real 
world. This generally promotes the institutions research program, and in particular makes it 
possible to establish how institutions emerge and are stabilized. 
Richard A. Posner (Chapter 32) also argues for the irnportance of organizations to the study 
of institutions, and identifies organization econornics as a key development. Organization 
econornics is concemed with the relation between organizational structure and compensation and 
with the relation between organizational structure and innovation, management of information 
ftows, agency costs, and efficiency in general. Posner discusses the two types of organizations 
that have exhibited significant organizational inefficiency problems: the publicly held prívate 
business firm and public organizations such as major govemment agencies. He then discusses 
two types of public organizations which have been relatively successful in organizational 
efficiency terms: judiciaries in common law nations and judiciaries in civillaw nations. 
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As his cases demonstrate, Posner is particular) y interested in what organizational economics 
can contribute to the field of law and economics. Thus he examines economic problems 
organizations encounter with an eye to how organizations operate in legal environments. For 
example, in the case of the prívate business firm, the issue of excessive executive compensation 
raises issues not only conceming agency costs but also conceming the legal rights of a firm 's 
shareholders. In the case of the two public organizations Posner discusses, US intelligence 
agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, competition and lack of communication 
between bureaucracies create inefficiencies in achieving agency goals while creating questions 
about the protection of citizen rights. In contrast, while common law and civillaw organizations 
can have efficiency problems as well, they tend to be well adapted to the legal systems in which 
they operate. 
Organization economics thus develops the understanding of institutions and formalizes many 
of its insights. lt does so by first looking within the organization and by investigating the 
relationship between an organization's goals · and culture, and secondly by judging this 
combination relative to the broader institutional environment, which is dynamic and changing. 
Part IX: The Third Sphere of the Economy and Institutions 
We close this volume by focusing on a special type of institution that we encounter in the so-
caBed third sphere or third sector of the economy, which generally includes non-profit 
organizations, charities, voluntary associations, mutuals, cooperatives, and social enterprises. 
Despite interest in the social sciences, this field has received relatively little attention in 
economics. 
Evers and Laville (2004: 13, 20-21) stress the context-specific characteristic of the third 
sector across countries, where social organizations interact with public legi~lation and welfare 
state policies, the values and practices of prívate business, contributions of informal family and 
community life, and initiatives by popular movements. Specifically, they distinguish between 
the US and European tradition: the former is highly inftuenced by the rational choice principie 
and re líes on the 'market and government failure thesis' to explain the emergence of the non-
profit sector; the latter reftects the 'social origins theory,' which highlights the historical and 
socio-political aspects of the third sector in pursing social welfare objectives against self-
regulating markets. 
We begin with Richard Steinberg's article (Chapter 33), published in 1997 in the joumal 
Voluntas, one of the most prominent in this line of research. He evaluates the capacity of 
economic theories to analyze the emergence and evolution of non-profit organizations. A 
general conclusion that arises from the author's exposition is that economic theories are use fui, 
but still ha ve a long way to go in determining the character, the origin, and effects of non-profit 
organizations. 
Specifically, Steinberg argues that more work needs to be done in terms of the various ways 
that the legal framework of tax and regulatory authorities have operationalized the non-distribution 
constraint, or have introduced altemative arrangements for the distribution of profits. This is a 
core feature of these organizations, which brings to the fore sorne of the central problems that are 
unique to the non-profit sector, compared with for-profit organizations, and are associated with 
govemance structures (stakeholder versus stockholder obligations and rights, particularly in 
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decision-making) and entrepreneurial and staff motivation (social/ethical values versus financia! 
incentive systems). He further stresses the need to develop useful distinctions between voluntary 
action and market exchange~ and more comprehensive explanations of the co-existence of the 
various for-profit, non-profit, and govemmental organizations. 
The author argues that transaction costs and public goods theories could provide an economic 
foundation for the analysis of non-profits. Nonetheless, he encourages cross-fertilization 
between economics and the other social sciences in order to capture the influence of endogenous 
preferences, stigma, and power in economic models and conduct field experiments to detect 
the characteristics of managers, volunteers, and recipient agencies. However, Steinberg presents 
the voluntary sector more as a service provider and less as an agent of advocacy and change 
in the pursuit of social welfare. 
We now tum to studies that focus on alternative types of not-for-profit organizations, which 
engage in production and commercial operations, based on interest objectives and structures 
that differ from for-profit organizations and the non-profit organizations examined by Steinberg. 
We begin with an early article by Frederic L. Pryor (Chapter 34 ), published in 1983. Pryor 
conducts a review of the literature on production cooperatives, covering a wide range of 
structures and developments that were also characteristic of former communist regimes. 
According to Pryor's institutional definition, a production cooperative is an organization where: 
production is collectivized; the net income is divided among its members according to sorne 
formula; there exist various ownership arrangements over the means of production; and 
members choose their leader and take active part in the decision-making process. 
Generally, the author observes that the growing literature on cooperatives reflects an interest 
in an alternative form of production that diverges from both extremes of heartless capitalism 
and soulless socialism. However, he feels that further theoretical and empirical studies need to 
be done in eco no mies to investigate the formation of production cooperatives and their impact 
on economic performance at the micro and macro level. 
One point worth mentioning is Pryor's comparison between production cooperatives and 
profit-maximizing firms, that is, between a labor-managed economy and a traditional capitalist 
economy. Case studies reveal that sorne producer cooperatives might fail to achieve sorne of 
their collective objectives, because of interna) or external constraints, such as intra-group 
dissension, limited financial resources, and political opposition. The author then speculates 
that production cooperatives might need to achieve sorne kind of 'critica) mass' before they 
can establish and maintain production in a competitive, profit-driven economy, and this depends 
on the social, economic, and legal environment that they face. 
We proceed to recent studies that focus on a more general type of third-sector organization, 
which includes cooperatives, namely the social enterprise. According to Chris Mason, James 
Kirkbrjde, and David Bryde (2007) (Chapter 35), social enterprises are distinguished from 
other third-sector organizations, such as non-profits and charities that rely on donations and 
grants, by virtue of the trading of products and services as a means to raise capital and finance 
their primary social objectives. For Giulia Galera and Cario Borzaga (2009) (Chapter 36), social 
enterprises combine entrepreneurial operations with the cooperative movement and stress the 
idea of collective entrepreneurship, which focuses on the needs of the most fragile segments 
of the population and the adoption of participatory governance structures. 
Both of these papers address questions posed in our two previous articles concerning the 
role played by the institutional environment of the third sector. In particular Mason et al. argue 
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that there is a need to adopt a broader theoretical context that focuses on the institutional 
embeddedness of govemance, in order to balance inherent tensions between having a business 
focus and supporting general-interest objectives. Drawing from existing governance theories, 
Mason et al. suggest that social enterprises can be most effectively infonned by the stakeholder 
approach (which emphasizes the enterprise's ultimate goal to serve the needs of a group or 
community and deliver a social benefit, based on democratic and ethical values) and the 
stewardship approach (which stresses the trustworthiness and pro-organization orientations of 
the enterprise's managers). The two are then combined within the context of a neo-institutional 
theory that is developed by the authors. 
Nonetheless, Mason et al. give lirnited attention to the different aspects of the institutional 
context that could influence social enterprises, by referring generally to cultural values as 
elements of the informal system. A more extensive discussion is provided by Galera and 
Borzaga, who focus on the impact of the legal framework of social enterprises, which often 
reftects the historical, political, and ethical conditions that determine the mission and operations 
of these organizations in society. 
After a very comprehensive exposition of the conceptualizations of social entrepreneurship 
and social enterprise, Galera and Borzaga conduct a case study of the legal frameworks applied 
in different European countries, including ltaly, Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Finland and 
the UK, and examine how social enterprises shape and are shaped by the legal forms established 
across national settings. They higWight the variety of conceptions, due to cultural and historical 
specificities, in relation to the mix of govemance structures and goals recognized for social 
enterprises, so that even at the level ofthe European Union they discover no common definition. 
In their attempt to devise a more general definition across European regions, they observe a 
social and legal system that sees the social enterprise in its new role as service provider and 
worker-integration organization, and determines key aspects of its function, such as general-
interest objectives, the adaptation of a non-distribution constraint, the participation of 
stakeholders, and public-private synergy. 
For the authors, the key aspect of the social enterprise is the opportunity for social change 
by questioning the very concept of enterprise asan organization that typically promotes the 
exclusive interests of its owners and profit maximization objectives. 
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